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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats are increasingly 
becoming one of the major concerns to many industries and 
organizations. Currently, there exists numerous articles and 
industrial reports describing various case studies of recent 
notable Advanced Persistent Threat attacks. However, these 
documents are expressed in natural language. This limits the 
efficient reusability of the threat intelligence information due to 
ambiguous nature of the natural language. In this article, we 
propose a model to formally represent Advanced Persistent 
Threats as multi-agent systems. Our model is inspired by the 
concepts of agent-oriented social modelling approaches, generally 
used for software security requirement analysis. 
Keywords— Attack trees; Advanced Persistent Threats; multi-
agent systems 
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), also 
known as targeted attacks, have set up a new trend of cyber 
espionage. Unlike the conventional attacks, APT attacks are 
launched by an organized group of highly skilled attackers with 
well-focused motives (e.g., stealing data, stealing money, 
espionage, etc.). The primary purpose of the threat intelligence 
is to help the organizations in understating the context of such 
threats. In this regard, many security organizations publish 
security bulletins and intelligence reports detailing on several 
case studies. However, this knowledge is generally shared as a 
list of documents that are written in natural language, like APT 
notes on github1. This raises the question of comprehensibility 
as well as the reusability of such reports. Besides, none of the 
existing models provide good support to model APT as they do 
not consider the coordinated behavioural aspects between the 
multiple threat agents [1], [2]. For this reason it is not yet clear 
on how to model APT like targeted attacks. In this article, we 
propose a graphical model to represent APT as multi-agent 
system. Our model is inspired by the concepts of agent-
oriented social modelling approaches, generally used for 
software security requirement analysis. We will illustrate our 
model using the carbanak APT case study. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II 
briefs on carbanak APT attack campaign and our analysis. 
Section III illustrates our model using carbanak APT 
campaign. We also briefly introduce the terminology and 
notation. I section IV, we discuss on the usability aspects of our 
model. Finally, we conclude our work in Section V. 
1 https://github.com/kbandla/APTnotes 
II. ANALYZING CARBANAK CASE STUDY
Carbanak APT[3], disclosed in public by Kaspersky labs in 
2015, targeted financial institutions like banks with an 
ultimate motive to steal money. This APT campaign is mainly 
executed in three phases: 1) Infection and transmission, 2) 
Harvest intelligence on target system operations and 3) 
orchestrate attacks to steal money. Starting with a simple 
social engineering attack to spread the carbanak malware, the 
attackers executed series of attacks to gain access to the 
critical systems of banks (e.g., bank servers). In carbanak, 
variety of ways were found to steal the money from the banks, 
thanks to the intelligence gained from video and other 
monitoring techniques allowing attackers to understand the 
operational workflow of the victim. For instance, attackers 
created fake transactions, through online banking or SWIFT 
transfers. These transactions were intelligently made after the 
regular verification process as per bank operations. It is also 
worth noting that the attackers had deliberately put an upper 
limit to the amount of stolen money per victim to $10 million 
USD. This value represents the maximum amount of money 
that can be transferred via mules or the maximum money 
budgeted by banks for fraud risks. 
From the carbanak case study, we acknowledge that an 
APT is a composite attack scenario involving multiple 
attacking agents (human or system) who use several attack 
methods and attack patterns such as coordinated attacks, 
parallel attacks, multi-step attacks in order to achieve their 
ultimate motives. All these aspects together make an APT 
sophisticated and complex while compared to a traditional 
attack. We designate them as the elements of an APT attacking 
system. In order to model such attacking system, we should be 
able to specify all these elements of the APT attacking system. 
Respectively, we provide a list of anticipated requirements 
based on the characteristic features observed in the example 
case study. It is to note that the list is not exhaustive and 
describes the minimum requirements needed to model APT: 
? Req1– Must use unambiguous modelling language.  
? Req2– Must facilitate to express all the attacking agents 
? Req3 – Must facilitate to express all the threat goals 
? Req4 – Must facilitate to express all the attack methods 
? Req5 – Must facilitate to trace the attack path 
? Req6 – Must facilitate to express the social and technical 
dependencies among the attacking agents (human/system). 
? Req7 – Must facilitate to express the protection goals 
? Req8 – Must facilitate to express the attack patterns used. 
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III. PROPOSED ANTI-STS MODEL
The current existing attack modelling techniques [1], [2], 
does not provide good support to model APT as they don’t 
facilitate to express multiple attacking agents and their 
interaction dependencies to succeed with the attack (Req2, 
Req6 and Req8). Therefore, we propose to view APTs as 
socio-technical systems representing the interplay of the 
attackers and technical systems in order to successfully 
execute the strategic plan. For this, it seems interesting to use 
a multi-agent systems approach integrating the social 
modelling concepts from STS model[4] and the Anti-goal 
modelling concepts from Secure KAOS[5] that are generally 
used in security requirements analysis. Respectively, in our 
model, we assume that the attackers’ goal is to build an APT 
campaign system. We name our approach as Anti-STS. 
Under this vision, the APT system has multiple attacking 
agents (human/system). We represent them as anti-system 
roles such as social engineer, hacker, system analyst, etc. who 
collaboratively work to manifest a threat (Req2). Figure 1 
depicts the comparison between the notations of STS and 
Anti-STS.  
Figure 1: Comparison between STS and Anti-STS Notations 
Accordingly, the pictogram used to represent the threat 
actor roles is depicted with horns. The malicious objectives are 
represented as the anti-goals within the scope of each threat 
actor, see Figure 1a. Threat scenarios are driven by some 
malicious motive (e.g., spoil reputation, gain money) and 
follow a procedural approach. The whole composite attack 
scenario is divided as responsibility goals of the respective 
threat actors and expressed as their root Anti-goal nodes 
(Req3). Subsequently, the steps involved in the attack methods 
are expressed as hierarchical threat actor/agent anti-goals trees 
using AND/OR constructs (Req4), see Figure 1b. Unlike 
Attack trees, a threat actor/agent can have more than one anti-
goal trees.  That means, the deliberate threat/Attack goals are 
defined as the root nodes. The tree structured refinements 
reflects how the threat goals can be fulfilled. 
The interaction dependencies are expressed similar to STS 
notation goal delegations and data exchange, except that here 
the intentions are towards manifesting a threat scenario (Figure 
1c). These social and technical dependency interactions allow 
to comprehend the strategic plan as well as to trace the attack 
path between the disjointed anti-goal models (Req5 and Req6). 
This allows to simplify the sophistication of APT by breaking 
the complex strategic scenario into multiple anti-goal models 
(Req1). Furthermore, we use threat propagation functionality 
in STS to represent the propagation of protection events such 
as defensive strategy goals to mitigate particular malicious goal 
(Figure 1d). Accordingly, the protection event propagation 
allows not only to link the protection goals to the anti-goals, 
but also it facilitates to view the protection impact on the whole 
Anti-goal tree model (Req7). 
IV. CARBANAK SPECIFIED IN ANTI-STS
Our principal motive is to define structured representation 
to facilitate the modelling and understanding. We refer to the 
threat intelligence reports and adopt following three steps to 
facilitate the modelling of Carbanak APT case study:  
A. Define threat actors and respective root Anti-goals
First is to identify the threat actors in the case study. The
Carbanak APT involved different people with varying skills 
such as social engineering experts to make spear phishing, the 
technical hackers to build the malware, system administrators 
to operate a set of C2 servers, banking experts to design the 
transfers of money and mules to get the cash at ATMs. In 
addition, there were several interactions between IT systems 
like the C2 servers and the malicious processes that were 
running in the victim’s computer. In Figure 2, we have defined 
the threat actors as separate roles with the different skillsets. 
This will facilitate to split the anti-goal refinements thereby 
reduce the complexity. Since APT includes an organized group 
of threat actors, we additionally considered a lead threat actor 
responsible for managing or even financing the group. We 
express this lead role as “Carbanak lead actor”. The ultimate 
goal, which is stealing money, is the root Anti-goal node 
defined in the scope of carbanak manager agent. 
B. Refine Anti-goals and identify interaction dependencies
After identifying the threat actors and their root goals, we
need to refine them with the help of the attack methods and 
patterns employed in APT. In this process, we come across the 
dependency interactions. For instance, the anti-goal “steal 
money” of the carbanak lead actor can be refined (see Figure 2) 
into three goals reflecting the three procedural phases executed 
in carbanak APT. The lead actor interact with other threat 
actors possessing necessary skills in order to fulfil some of its 
anti-goals. In Figure 2, we expressed this social interaction 
dependency as anti-goal delegation notation. The delegated 
anti-goal refinements are defined in the scope of the respective 
threat actors. These further refinements may give rise to new 
anti-goal delegation needs. For example, the threat actor 
responsible for social engineering may have to await the hacker 
to obtain the malicious files embedded with malware program 
code. 
Figure 2:Anti-goal refinement of the Carbanak lead actor 
In similar fashion, our Anti-STS model also facilitates to 
view the technical interaction dependencies between the 
system threat agents. In the threat intelligence report of the 
carbanak APT campaign, it is given that at some point the 
malware program from the infected machine establishes a 
connection with the command and control (C2) server 
(operated by “system admin attacker”) in order to share the 
proxy settings as well as to download the “kldconfig.plug” file. 
This file seemed to have contained the names of the processes 
that needed to be monitored. This implies a technical 
interaction dependency which allows the attackers operating 
the C2 server, to gain remote access to the infected machines. 
Figure 3 depicts an example of such interaction. It is to note 
that this figure reflects only small portion of the anti-goal 
refinement of the malware program code. 
C. Specify the given control measures as protection events
Finally, in the threat intelligence reports a security measure
is proposed to detect and/or protect against the described APT. 
In our carbanak example, Kaspersky labs proposes to detect the 
malware by looking for a “.bin” file in folder “..\All 
users\%AppData%\Mozilla\”. Our model allows the 
expression of this information using the protection event 
notation, see Figure 3. In addition, the propagation of 
protection events facilitates to view the impact of the protection 
across the Anti-goal model. 
Figure 3: Example of some technical interaction dependencies 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we proposed an anti-social modelling 
approach to model APT as an anti-system. Our modelling 
approach, named as as Anti-STS, revolves around the core idea 
of expressing the social and technical dependencies between 
the threat actors in an APT campaign. It is worth noting that, 
although it may seem that our model is relevant to STS 
approach only, the driving motivation and the usability context 
of our Anti-STS are completely different and complementary. 
Our model is purely aimed towards developing a common 
platform to formally represent the threat intelligence on notable 
APT like attacks. This will permit the users to have a common 
modelling language to express the APTs which can be shared 
and reused with less ambiguities.  
For future works we intend to improve our model to 
highlight and distinguish the varying attack patterns employed 
in APT campaigns. (Req8 in Section II). Furthermore, it would 
be interesting to integrate multiple APT campaigns which will 
help the risk analysts to compare and analyse the different 
versions of carbanak APT. 
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